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Transaction Structures in the Developing World: 
Evidence from Private Equity  
 
Josh Lerner and Antoinette Schoar*  
 
While variations in public securities markets across nations have attracted increasing 
scrutiny, private financings have received little attention.  But in developing nations, the 
bulk of financings are private ones.  This paper analyzes 210 private equity transactions 
in developing countries. We find that unlike in the U.S., where convertible preferred 
securities are ubiquitous, in developing nations a much broader array of securities are 
employed and private equity investors often have fewer contractual protections.  The 
choice of security appears to be driven by the legal and economic circumstances of the 
nation and the private equity group.  Investments in common law nations are structured 
similar to those in the U.S., being less likely to employ common stock or straight debt, 
and more likely to use preferred stock with a variety of covenants.  By way of contrast, in 
nations where the rule of law is less established, private equity groups are likely to use 
common stock and own the majority of the firm’s equity if the investment encounters 
difficulties. Private equity groups based in the U.S. and U.K. rely more on preferred 
securities but also adapt transactions to local conditions.  These contractual differences 
appear to have real consequences: larger transactions with higher valuations are seen in 
common law countries. These findings suggest that the structure of a country’s legal 
system affects private contracts and cannot easily be undone by (bi-lateral) private 
solutions. 
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1. Introduction 
The literature on law and finance has highlighted the variation of financial 
transactions across countries with different legal regimes and the implications for 
economic outcomes.  The majority of these studies, however, have focused on the 
structure of the countries’ public markets.  Only a handful of works have studied the 
effects of legal origins on the functioning of private transactions.  But as a growing 
literature highlights, public markets in developing countries play only a very limited role 
relative to private transactions in the financing of investments.  Figure 1 shows that the 
overall market capitalization of public firms constitutes only a small fraction of GDP in 
developing countries, while in developed economies like the US the ratio is above 100 
percent.1  Overall, there is a greater reliance on private transactions in developing 
countries than in developed economies. Moreover, from the extensive literature on the 
role of stock markets across countries (see, for instance, Demirgüc-Kunt and Levine 
[2001]), we might anticipate that the dynamics of public and private transactions would 
be quite different.  Therefore, it is important to understand how the legal system and the 
varying enforcement of laws in different countries across the world affect the structure of 
private transactions.  
 
In this paper, we analyze how contracting choices by private parties respond to 
their country’s legal regime, and if the differences in the contracting environment are 
                                                 
1We present data for the nine developing countries from which we obtain the bulk of our 
sample.  We observe a few outlier countries that have very small economies but serve as 
financial centers for the surrounding regions, such as Hong Kong, Singapore, and 
Luxembourg. 
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reflected in the real outcomes of the investments: e.g., the valuation and size of the 
financings. An alternative view might suggest that private parties are able to design 
contracts in such a way to “contract around” any differences in the legal environment so 
as to replicate the first-best contracts (see for example Johnson, McMillan, and Woodruff 
[2002]).   
 
We focus on a specific set of private transactions: private equity investments. We 
concentrate on these transactions for two reasons: contracts in this area are well 
documented and second, in contrast to other private transactions, follow a relatively 
standardized set-up. Private equity transactions represent a relatively modest share of the 
absolute value of investments made in most developing countries. But we think that they 
are representative of the legal and economic considerations that private parties face in 
any contract negotiation. Because of these advantages, we believe that private equity 
deals are ideal for a comparison of contractual structures and outcomes across countries. 
 
We were able to collect data on the actual contractual relationships between 
investors and entrepreneurs. Using a sample of 210 transactions from a wide variety of 
private equity groups, we explore the variation in deal structures across different 
countries in which the investments are made. This analysis allows us to shed light on the 
contracting challenges that equity-holders face in countries with different legal regimes. 
 
We also contrast the contracting choices of local private equity groups with those 
of foreign investors, in particular, U.S.- and U.K.-based organizations. If differences in 
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contracting choices reflect the level of the country’s financial know-how (or business 
practices), we would expect that private equity groups based in the nations with the most 
developed private equity industries would rely on contract provisions that are similar to 
the ones they use at home, no matter where they invest. If contracting differences are 
instead driven by underlying constraints in a country’s legal system, however, we would 
expect that even foreign private equity groups will adopt local contracting standards.  
 
We find that legal origin, rule of law, and judicial efficiency are important in 
explaining cross sectional differences in contracts across countries. While U.K.- and 
U.S.-based private equity groups are somewhat more likely to write contracts that 
resemble provisions in their home countries, they do not fully replicate U.S.-style 
contracts and adjust many provisions to the local environment. Overall, we infer that 
there is a strong need for groups to “go local” in their contracting choices. In a 
contemporaneous paper, Kaplan, Martel, and Stromberg [2003] investigate a similar 
question for a set of high-income European countries. The results in their paper differ 
from ours quite substantially; since they do not find that private equity groups based in 
common law based countries tend to “go local.” We discuss these results and their 
relationship to our study in more detail in Section 3.   
 
Several striking patterns emerge from the analysis.  Unlike in the United States, 
where the use of convertible preferred securities is ubiquitous in private equity, 
substantially different securities are employed in developing nations.  More than one-half 
of the transactions employ common stock, and a subset of deals even uses debt. The 
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choice of securities appears to be driven by the legal regime in the country and the nature 
of the private equity group. Investments in countries with a common law tradition and 
where the rule of law is well established are far less likely to employ common stock or 
straight debt, and more likely to employ preferred stock. Similarly, transactions in 
common law nations are generally associated with greater contractual protections such as 
more covenants favoring the private equity group.  By way of contrast, investors in non-
common law countries, whether with French or socialist legal backgrounds, appear to 
rely more heavily on obtaining majority control of the firm’s equity.   
 
Surprisingly, the composition of boards of directors differs only slightly from that 
seen in the United States. Common law countries have more substantial representation of 
founders and managers on the board, while French legal origin countries have more 
private equity group representatives on the board. These findings suggest that board 
structure and majority equity ownership may serve as a substitute for contractual 
protections. 
 
Finally, we investigate if the observed differences in contractual terms across legal 
regimes also relate to differences in the valuation and size of the investments made.  We 
find that firms’ (implied) valuations are significantly higher in nations with better rule of 
law and those with a common law tradition. Also, countries with better rule of law have 
significantly higher levels of financing. The difference in financing levels between 
common law and civil law countries is not significant, but both have higher financing 
levels than countries with socialist legal origins.  While we would like to examine the 
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outcome of transactions as well, the relative youth of the investments and the limited 
opportunities that these private equity groups have had to exit the investments precluded 
such an analysis. 
 
 These systematic differences suggest that contracting parties do face different 
constraints across legal regimes. This effect is robust even after controlling for the 
headquarters of the private equity group: our results are not purely driven by common 
law funds investing in common law countries.  In fact, we find that U.S.- and U.K.- based 
funds invest in a wide range of countries with different legal backgrounds.  
 
A natural question is whether private equity groups vary their contracting choices 
across countries because of differences in investor protection and enforcement of laws, or 
because of direct constraints on the type of contracts that can be written. For instance, it 
would not be a surprise to see little reliance on convertible preferred securities, if the 
security law in the country prevents the use of convertible preferred altogether. We 
addressed this concern by seeking to understand the legal curbs on private equity groups 
in the nine nations most frequently represented in our sample. We do not find evidence 
that the results are “hard-wired” by constraints on the contract space; our findings hold 
even when we exclude those countries where the private equity groups face a constrained 
choice set.    
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The plan of this paper is as follows.  Section 2 briefly reviews the earlier 
literature.  Section 3 describes the construction of the data set.  The analysis is in Section 
4.  The final section concludes the paper. 
 
2. Related Literature and Its Implications 
Our analysis is at the intersection of two bodies of work.  First, an extensive “law 
and finance” literature in recent years has highlighted the importance of a nation’s legal 
origins in determining the structure and efficiency of its financial (and other) institutions.  
Many institutions in developing countries are not indigenous, but rather have been 
transplanted during colonization: for instance, English colonies widely adopted common 
law-based legal systems, while colonies of French legal family nations adopted civil law 
codes.  A variety of papers have documented the importance of legal origin, starting with 
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny [1997, 1998].  They identify legal 
origin as a crucial determinant of the laws governing the protection of outside investors 
from expropriation by corporate insiders, with common law systems providing better 
protection than civil law ones.  They also show that better investor protection is strongly 
associated with broader and more valuable capital markets, a faster pace of public 
offerings, more dispersed ownership of public firms, and other indicators of financial 
development. Subsequent research shows that civil law countries exhibit other 
problematic features, such as heavier government intervention in economic activity (La 
Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny [1999]) and more burdensome regulation 
of new business entry (Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer [2002b]).  
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The second body of related empirical literature examines the structure of venture 
capital investments.  For a detailed review of theoretical literature on the structure of 
these transactions, the reader is referred to Kaplan and Stromberg [2003].  This work, 
such as Gompers [1995], Gompers [1998], and Kaplan and Stromberg [2003], has largely 
focused on the United States.  The authors emphasize the crucial impact of the degree of 
uncertainty surrounding the transaction.  In settings where there is substantial uncertainty 
surrounding the new venture, greater informational asymmetries should be present and 
the contribution of the entrepreneur should be more critical.  In these settings, private 
equity investors will need to take steps to protect themselves from agency problems.  
These analyses will serve as an important benchmark for us. But our focus here will not 
be on the differences between certain industries and types of investments, but on the 
variation across different countries and legal regimes.     
 
A couple of earlier academic studies have explicitly compared private equity 
investments across a number of developing countries. Jeng and Wells [2001] analyze the 
determinants of venture capital for a panel data set of 21 (mostly developed) countries.  
They find that IPOs are the strongest driver of venture capital investing, particularly later-
stage investments. Early-stage venture capital investing, however, is relatively unaffected 
by IPO activity but negatively impacted by labor market rigidities. Cumming and 
MacIntosh [2002] examine the types of transactions funded and exit routes employed in 
12 Asian nations.  They argue that the legal regimes affect the types of investments 
selected and the way in which the private equity groups exit their holdings, but not the 
level of the returns the investors enjoy.  
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The paper that follows our analysis most closely is Kaplan, Martel, and Stromberg 
[2003]. The authors focus on private equity contracts in a number of higher-income 
European countries. Parallel to our analysis, they find that contracting choices vary across 
countries with different legal regimes. Interestingly, however, when controlling for the 
legal origin of the private equity group, they do not find the “going local” effect that we 
document for our sample of developing countries. Instead, they show that most of the 
variation between common law and civil law contracts can be explained by the fact that 
U.K.- and U.S.-based private equity groups use contracts that are very similar to the ones 
they employ in their home countries.  It is possible that the higher sophistication of the 
judicial system in these countries allows private equity groups to experiment with 
contracts that are different from those customarily employed. One might also conjecture, 
however, that a perceived sense of similarity between the U.S. and Continental Europe 
led investors in some cases to make contracting choices that might ultimately be very 
difficult to enforce in these countries.  
 
3. The Sample 
We constructed the sample by approaching a number of private equity groups 
active in developing nations.2  We asked each to provide us with the investment 
                                                 
2According to the World Bank, developing nations are those countries that have either 
low- or middle-level per capita incomes; have underdeveloped capital markets; and/or are 
not industrialized.  It should be noted, however, that the application of these criteria is 
somewhat subjective.  For instance, Kuwait appears on many lists of developing nations 
despite its high per capita gross domestic product.  The reason for its inclusion lies in the 
income distribution inequality that exists there, which has not allowed it to reach the 
general living standards of developed countries.  For the purposes of this paper, we take 
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memorandum or private placement memorandum of as many transactions as possible, as 
well as the associated stock purchase agreements, preferred stock agreements, and any 
other documents associated with the structuring and governance of the transaction.  We 
asked groups to choose a representative array of transactions, along dimensions such as 
the type of deal, the location and industry of the firm, and the success of the transaction.  
Given the lack of any comprehensive database of private equity transactions in the 
developing world, it was difficult to verify the completeness of the sample. 
 
We deliberately attempted to recruit as diverse an array of private equity funds as 
possible.  To this end, we complemented our own direct contacts (which were 
disproportionately those of large and U.S.-based groups) with those of four international 
development organizations, which tend to invest in smaller funds based in developing 
countries.  These organizations encouraged funds in which they were invested to provide 
data as well. 
 
Table 1 summarizes the sample.  The 210 transactions are from 28 private equity 
groups, who contributed between 2 and 21 deals for our sample.  The transactions 
occurred between 1987 and 2003, with the bulk of investments having been made 
between 1996 and 2002.  We first assigned the industries to detailed classes.  Because a 
number of these industries shared common characteristics (e.g., a considerable number of 
                                                                                                                                                 
an expansive view of what constitutes a developing nation, and simply eliminate any 
transactions taking place in the 24 nations who were original members of the 
Organisation for Cooperation and Development or joined within the first fifteen years of 
its creation (i.e., through the addition of New Zealand in 1973). 
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transactions were in traditional manufacturing industries that are characterized by little 
R&D and few intangible assets), we consolidated the categories.  The industries include a 
broad array, from food to information technology. 
 
We classified the transactions by type using the definitions in European Venture 
Capital Association [2002].  The investments are dominated by expansion transactions 
(which typically entail the provision of capital in growing firms that are more mature than 
the typical venture-backed concern), as well as venture capital and buyout transactions.  
The other transactions are, as discussed above, less commonly seen in developed nations, 
such as investments in privatizations, initial public offerings, and acquisitions. 
 
The nations represented are summarized in the final panel of Table 1.  Thirty 
distinct countries are represented, from Africa, the Americas, Asia, and Eastern Europe.  
No single nation or region dominates the sample.  
 
From Panel A of Table 2, we see that the average GNP per capita for the countries 
in our sample is $2142 per year. Moreover, 27% of the investments included in our study 
are based in countries that have British legal origins, 30% in countries that have French 
legal origins, and 42% are in former socialist countries. By way of comparison, 56% of 
the investments included in this study are funded by private equity partnerships that are 
based either in the U.S. or U.K.  While U.K.- and U.S.-based partnerships in our sample 
make the majority of investments in countries with a British legal origin, we find that 
they also invest in a large fraction of deals that are not based in common law countries.  
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This heterogeneity is important, since it will allow us to analyze whether a given 
partnership adjusts the contract terms in response to the environment of the country 
where the deal takes place. 
 
To get a deeper understanding of the extent to which the choices of the private 
equity groups were driven by the laws in each nation, we research the legal factors 
affecting private equity groups in the nine nations most frequently represented in our 
sample.  We recruited a number of L.L.M. candidates at Harvard Law School from these 
respective countries.  We asked them to research the factors influencing private equity 
funds in their home country, through an examination of the relevant texts and interviews 
with practitioners who work in private equity in the respective countries.   This 
information is presented in highly summarized form in the Appendix.3 
 
In a study along these lines, selection biases are an almost inevitable consequence.  
(At least somewhat ameliorating this concern, we obtained transactions from a significant 
number of groups.)  It is likely that the private equity groups that participated in this 
study are more Western-oriented and sophisticated than their peers.  The presence of 
these biases make the substantial differences that we see from the U.S. patterns even 
more striking.  
 
4. Analysis 
                                                 
3More detailed documentation of the key legal considerations for each of these countries 
can be obtained from the authors. 
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We proceed in several steps.  We first examine the broad characteristics of the 
transactions. We then consider the types of securities employed. We next turn to 
understanding the allocation of equity ownership. We consider several dimensions of 
how the control over the company is allocated.  We look at the size and valuation of the 
investments.  Finally, we look at the correlations between these various contractual 
features. 
 
A. Summary Statistics 
Panel B of Table 2 provides an initial overview of the transactions.  The 
differences between this sample and U.S. transactions are striking. We will highlight 
several examples.  In the United States, private equity transactions are dominated by 
those employing convertible preferred stock: nearly 80% of the transactions in Kaplan 
and Stromberg’s [2003] sample of 200 U.S. deals rely on this security.4  Common stock 
is quite rare, found in only a little more than 10% of the U.S. deals.  In our sample, the 
transactions are dominated by common stock: fully 54% of the developing country 
transactions employ these securities.  Convertible preferred stock is only encountered in 
21% of the deals.5 
                                                 
4It should be noted that Kaplan and Stromberg’s sample includes only venture capital 
transactions, which would encompass transactions described as “venture capital” and 
“expansion” transactions in the developing world.  (The category of “expansion” deals is 
not frequently employed in the U.S.)  Legal texts (e.g., Bartlett [1995]), however, suggest 
we would observe similar patterns if we examined all U.S. private equity transactions. 
 
5We tried as best as possible to avoid any bias in our coding of contractual terms that are 
purely based on differences in contractual language. For example, any security structure 
that has payoff streams equivalent to a convertible preferred would be classified as such, 
even if the contract did not explicitly use that term. 
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Second, many of the protections commonly employed by venture capitalists in the 
U.S. are rarely found here.  Kaplan and Stromberg [2003] find that venture capitalists 
obtain redemption rights in 84% of the transactions, anti-dilution protection in 95% of 
deals, and founder vesting requirements in 42% of transactions.  The corresponding 
shares in our sample are 31%, 27%, and 5%. 
 
Finally, the structure of the boards differs little from that seen in the U.S.  The 
mean U.S. transaction has a board with 6.2 members, of which two seats were allocated 
to the founders and managers and two-and-a-half to venture capitalists (Kaplan and 
Stromberg [2003]).  The patterns here are similar, though we see a slightly greater 
representation of founders and managers on the boards.  
 
In Table 3, we include a number of representative provisions that reflect some of 
the interesting differences with the private equity contracts typically observed in the U.S. 
Two aspects are particularly interesting. First, the lack of liquid capital markets in these 
countries means that the choice of exit option is very different from the U.S. For 
example, many private equity contracts in our sample of emerging market deals 
implicitly—but often explicitly—state that the preferred exit option is a “sale to a 
strategic buyer.”  In eight cases, a potential strategic buyer even invests alongside the 
private equity group in the financing transaction. Also, we see a much greater tendency to 
rely on large dividend payments out of profits when exit through an IPO or sale is not 
possible.  
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A second interesting feature is the reliance on parent companies to either enforce 
or back up deals. In many developing countries, ownership structures of firms are much 
more complicated and pyramidal than in the U.S. Often a company is ultimately 
controlled by a parent company that holds important control rights (but not always cash 
flow rights of similar magnitude). We see that in a few instances, private equity groups 
use the parent companies to back the loans of the subsidiary. Moreover, in seven cases 
we see that the parent provides a potential exit strategy for the private equity group: the 
investors are allowed to put back the stock they own to the parent, whose shares are 
probably much more liquid (and potentially less volatile). 
 
B. Regression Analysis 
The econometric analysis throughout the paper employs a similar structure: we 
begin by analyzing the provisions in the transactions using dummy variables for each 
provision.  
 
The main explanatory variables we are interested in are the countries’ legal origin 
and their contractual and economic circumstances surrounding the private equity 
investments. We also control for industry, deal type, and year fixed effects.6  While we 
                                                 
6We use dummy variables for the observations in three time periods in the reported 
regressions: the years 1993 to 1997, 1998 to 2000, and 2001 to 2003.  These periods 
correspond respectively to the years when many institutions made initial investments into 
private equity funds focusing on leveraged buyouts in developing nations, the growth of 
venture capital funding in these nations, and the recent sharp fall-off in venture capital 
and private equity activity there.  The results are robust to the use of dummy variables for 
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believe that the use of these control variables is necessary to avoid potential biases, they 
come at a cost: the large numbers of dummy variables play havoc with the results when 
we employ a non-linear specification.  Thus, while the univariate nature of many of the 
dependent variables might suggest the use of a logit specification, we will simply report 
ordinary least squares results.  (Results employing logit specifications without industry 
dummy variables are generally very similar.) 
 
We also anticipate that the following dimensions may be important in affecting 
contracting choices due to underlying differences in the nature and development stage of 
a country, independent of the country’s legal origin. Therefore we include a number of 
time-varying control variables: 
• The extent of economic development in the nation.  The nature of the opportunities 
that the private equity investors face may differ substantially with the degree of 
development of the nation, which will in turn be a function of its initial resources 
and many other considerations.  These environmental factors may affect both the 
size and nature of available financing opportunities, and in turn influence the 
contracting structures as well.  We employ the per capita gross national product 
(in current dollars) averaged over the 1990s. 
• The extent of the rule of law in the nation.  Since the relationship between a 
private equity investor and an entrepreneur is fundamentally a contractual one, the 
manner and ease with which property rights can be protected in the courts is a 
                                                                                                                                                 
each year, as well as to the use of controls measuring the annual level of private equity 
fundraising worldwide and of foreign direct investment into developing nations.   
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critical measure.  As a result, the types of arrangements entered into between 
these parties should differ.  The measure we employ, originally developed by the 
Fraser Institute, was employed in Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson [2001].  This 
index is a rating on a scale from zero to ten, with the greater the equality of parties 
and the access to a non-discriminatory judiciary, the higher the score.7 
• A measure of judicial efficiency.  An alternative measure of the legal protection 
that firms can expect in a given country is the index of judicial efficiency.  It 
represents an assessment of the “efficiency and integrity of the legal environment 
as it affects business, particularly foreign firms.”  It may be “taken to represent 
investors’ assessment of conditions in the country in question.” This measure 
focuses more on the enforcement of laws rather than the way the law is written. It 
employs a scale from 0 to 10, with lower scores representing lower efficiency 
levels. This measure is produced by the country risk-rating agency International 
Country Risk (ICR), and has been previously used in Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-
de-Silanes, and Shleifer [2002a]. 
 
Throughout, we employ logarithms of the non-univariate dependent and 
independent variables.  Our rationale is that the impact of many of the measures is likely 
to be non-linear.  For instance, the shift from $500 to $600 in per capita GNP is likely to 
be far more meaningful than one from $8500 to $8600.  
                                                 
7We compared this measure to the index of property right protection developed in the 
1997 Index of Economic Freedom, which was used in La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, 
Shleifer, and Vishny [1999].  The correlation coefficient between the two measures is 
high (0.82), but the rule of law measure was available for a considerably larger number of 
countries. 
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B1. Security Types 
We begin the econometric analyses by examining the types of securities 
employed. Panel A of Table 4 shows that common stock is less frequently employed in 
nations with a British legal origin.  This pattern continues to hold when we add controls 
for whether the private equity group is based in a common law country. Thus, the 
observed pattern is not simply a consequence of the fact that investments in common law 
countries are disproportionately made by funds based in nations such as the United 
States.   Meanwhile, groups based in the U.S. and U.K. use common stock less often.  
(The results do weaken when we employ a measure of judicial efficiency as well, which 
reduces the sample size.)  A similar pattern is seen in the use of straight debt in Panel B: 
such a security is much less frequently employed in common law countries and by U.S.- 
and U.K.-based funds. 
 
The reverse pattern is observed in Panel C of Table 4, where we examine the use 
of preferred stock.  This security, so ubiquitous in the U.S., is disproportionately seen in 
nations with British legal origins and in transactions undertaken by American and British 
private equity groups.  The security is also employed when the index of judicial 
efficiency is higher.  (Nations with French legal origins are also significantly more likely 
to employ such provisions in this regression, but not in other specifications.) 
 
We then repeat this analysis while excluding any countries that have legal 
restrictions on the type of securities that can be used in private equity transactions. The 
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idea is that we want to prevent our results from being “hard wired” by legal constraints in 
different countries. For example, in the case of the Peoples Republic of China, domestic 
as well as foreign firms can only get permission to use security structures other than 
common stock in very exceptional cases. We find that the results presented above are 
qualitatively unchanged when excluding nations from the sample that have any 
constraints. This suggests that our findings reflect the investors’ contracting choices and 
not just the constraints imposed by different legal regimes.  
 
B2. Allocation of Equity 
We then turn to the allocation of equity ownership.  Panels A and B of Table 5 
examine the allocation of control of the company’s equity to the private equity group.  
The dependent variable is a dummy that takes on the value one if the private equity 
investors have at least 50% of the equity, calculated at their maximum and minimum 
stake respectively.  (The size of the stake can vary, whether due to contingent clauses or 
the vesting of founder and manager shares.)  Panel C of Table 5 analyzes the magnitude 
of the difference between the largest and smallest ownership stake assigned to the private 
equity group.   
 
The key findings are as follows: 
• When the rule of law is more established, private equity groups are less likely to 
have control of the firms’ equity in the maximum stake scenario as well as the 
minimum stake scenario.  When we add a judicial efficiency measure as well, it 
becomes consistently negatively significant, while the coefficient on the rule of 
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law variable declines.  This finding is consistent with a theme that emerged from 
our conversations with private equity groups.  The groups highlighted that they 
placed much greater emphasis on having controlling blocks of the equity of firms 
in nations with poor property rights, particularly during periods when 
performance was troublesome.  
• Second, investments in nations with a common law legal tradition are more likely 
to have control under the maximum scenario. Private equity groups based in the 
U.K. and U.S. are similarly more likely to have control stakes in the maximum 
control scenario, but less likely to have controlling stakes in the minimum control 
scenario. This suggests a greater reliance of these groups on variations in 
ownership control as an incentive mechanism for founders and managers, as well 
as a protection in bad states, perhaps due to their greater ability to enforce 
contingent contracts. (For a formal treatment of this point, see Gennaioli [2003].) 
This idea is also reconfirmed in the analysis of differences between maximum and 
minimum ownership stakes in Panel C of Table 6. Again we find that U.K. legal 
origin countries have much greater variation between the maximum and minimum 
control stakes than civil law countries. 
• Finally, investments in countries with a higher GNP per capita are more likely to 
allow the private equity group to have control in the maximum and minimum 
stake scenarios, as well as to use contingent securities. 
 
B3. Control Rights 
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The next four tables analyze what we term control rights: provisions that affect 
the prerogatives of the private equity investors or the managers they finance.  Here 
several consistent themes emerge.  Transactions in common law countries are more likely 
to offer protections for the private equity investors.  We also find that private equity 
groups based in the U.K. and U.S. demand more protections than others.  Finally, deals in 
wealthier nations are generally more likely to include investor protections. 
 
More specifically, we find the following results for these contract provisions: 
• First, in Table 6 we analyze the existence of anti-dilution provisions, the right to 
have some compensation if subsequent financing is done at a lower price, and 
provisions for automatic conversion.  Lawyers typically interpret the latter as 
protecting the lead private equity investor against individual or smaller private 
equity investors, who may seek to “hold up” an IPO or acquisition by refusing to 
convert their shares.  It should be noted that while many nations give investors 
rights to preserve their pro rata equity share in future financings, anti-dilution 
provisions give far greater protections to the private equity groups.8  We find that 
investments in nations with a common law tradition tend to have more 
protections, as seen in the analyses of the anti-dilution provisions and automatic 
conversion provisions.  Similarly we find that higher per capita GNP generally is 
related to a higher degree of protection against anti-dilution and automatic 
                                                 
8We were able to identify one nation that legally prohibited dilutive financings (Brazil).  
The results continued to hold when we excluded this nation from the sample. 
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conversion provisions. We also observe that U.S.- and U.K.-based private equity 
groups tend to rely more heavily on these protections. 
 
• Table 7 looks at the extent to which the ability of founders and management to 
liquidate their stake is constrained, either through provisions regarding vesting 
(the staged provision of shares to management) or explicit restrictions on stock 
sales.  Because we did not always receive the agreements between the companies 
and managers from the private equity groups, we can measure this phenomenon in 
a less thorough manner than the other transaction characteristics.9 The results 
regarding these contract dimensions did not show any significant patterns. One 
possible explanation was the small sample size for this analysis. 
 
• Table 8 investigates the structure of the board as specified in the stock purchase 
agreements, examining the overall board size as well as the seats assigned to the 
private equity group and founders and managers. We see that common law 
nations tend to have larger boards with greater representation of founders and 
managers on the board. One possible interpretation of this finding is that the 
effectiveness of other methods of enforcing investor rights is sufficiently large, so 
that the addition of other board members, and the possible loss of control entailed, 
is less critical. 
 
                                                 
9Again, the results continued to hold when we excluded China, where managerial equity 
holdings are sharply limited. 
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• Finally, Table 9 looks at supermajority provisions.  These provisions regarding 
supermajority approval (where some fraction greater than one-half of the 
members must approve a decision) appear nineteen different places in these 
agreements.  We score these clauses from zero to three, with a higher score 
representing a more stringent supermajority clause.10  We simply sum these 
separate scores. We find that investments in common law nations are more likely 
to employ supermajority provisions, while investments in civil law countries are 
less likely to include them in the contracts. Similarly, deals in richer nations rely 
more frequently on supermajority provisions. A puzzling finding in our data is the 
reduced use of supermajority provisions in countries with better rule of law. 
Countries with better judicial efficiency, however, tend to rely more frequently on 
these provisions (though this result is only significant at the 10% level).  
 
C. Financing Characteristics 
A natural question, suggested by La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny 
[2003], relates to the consequences of these investment choices.  Ultimately, we would 
like to examine this question by looking at the relationship between transaction structures 
and outcomes of the investments.  Given the relative recentness of most of the 
investments, and the limited ability that investors have had to exit private equity 
investments in developing countries in recent years, such an analysis would be premature. 
                                                 
10Zero represents a case with no such provision.  Cases where a supermajority of the 
shareholders must approve the step are coded as one; instances where a supermajority of 
the board must approve are coded as two.  Three denotes cases where a supermajority of 
both equity-holders and board must approve. 
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Instead, we simply focus on the characteristics of the financial transaction: the size of the 
financing and the associated valuation.   
 
When we look at the size of the financing in Panel A of Table 10, we see that (not 
surprisingly) investments in firms with higher sales and in nations with greater per capita 
GNP involve larger disbursements of capital.  In addition, transactions in common law 
countries and by private equity groups based in the U.S. and U.K. are larger in 
magnitude, though the effects are less consistent. 
 
When we turn to valuations,11 we find again that firms with larger revenues are 
associated with higher valuations.  Both countries rooted in the British and French legal 
families are assigned higher valuations, though the magnitude of the effect is 
considerably larger and more consistently significant in the common law nations.  Higher 
GNP per capita and American and British private equity investors are associated as well 
with higher valuations.  Finally, the index of judicial efficiency is strongly associated 
with higher valuations.  All these findings suggest that the differences in legal regime 
affect not just the structure of these transactions, but also have real effects on firms’ 
value.12     
                                                 
11Following Gompers and Lerner [2000], we examine the “post-money” valuation: the 
valuation of the firm after the completion of the financing transaction.  As noted above, 
the results remain robust when we add additional controls for the characteristics of the 
firms and transactions. 
 
12Our interpretation of these results must be somewhat cautious since we only observe 
realized transactions. Common law countries might have better protection of shareholder 
rights and we would therefore expect to see higher valuations for a given investment. 
Investments that are completed in non-common law countries, however, might be 
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D. Correlation of Different Contract Parts 
To this point, we have been analyzing each of the contractual features in isolation.  
In the final analysis, we investigate the correlation structure between different parts of the 
individual contracts. Our goal is to understand whether security structure, ownership 
stake, and other control provisions are used as complements or substitutes in financial 
contracting.  For example, we could imagine that deals where the private equity group 
takes a common stock position rely more heavily on having a controlling ownership 
stake.  In that case, even though the security structure per se does not give the private 
equity group as much control rights as a preferred security would, the fact that the group 
has the majority ownership stake could be seen as an alternative control mechanism. 
 
To undertake this analysis, we regress each of the variables of interest on each 
other, as well as controls for the logarithm of gross national product, the rule of law 
index, and the dummy variables for the year, industry, and deal type. In Panel A, we look 
at the correlation between various contractual provisions; in Panel B, we examine the 
correlation with financing size and valuation.  In each cell we report only three sets of 
numbers: each line represents the coefficient of a regression of a contract part on a 
different provision of the contract. We repeat these regressions for the entire sample, for 
the common law nations only, and for the other nations. 
                                                                                                                                                 
particularly promising. Thus, there may not be as many differences in the intensive 
margin, i.e. the observed amount of financing, as along the extensive margin (the number 
and types of deals that are done). As discussed before, it is impossible for us to construct 
an exhaustive sample of deals for these countries, which makes it very difficult to draw 
any conclusions about the extensive margin. 
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 Table 11 shows a number of results from this exercise: 
• First, we see that while the use of debt and debt-like securities is positively related 
to the presence of common shares, we find a negative correlation between 
common and preferred stock. 
• We find that preferred stock offerings are more likely to employ other control 
provisions such as anti-dilution and automatic conversion provisions. These 
effects are strongest in common law nations. These features are generally 
negatively associated with common stock.  
• We find a strong positive correlation between the maximum ownership stakes that 
the private equity group obtains and the use of debt. The correlation between the 
maximum ownership stake and the use of preferred securities is inconsistent and 
rather small.  If we look at the correlation of a private equity group’s minimum 
ownership stake with the other contract parts (not reported), the difference 
between common and preferred stock deals becomes even stronger. 
• Common stock is correlated with smaller deal sizes and valuations.  Contractual 
provisions that protect investors (e.g., anti-dilution and automatic conversion 
provisions) are associated with higher valuations, but this effect seems confined to 
common law nations. 
Overall, these results suggest that contracts differ systematically in the way they aim to 
provide investors with control rights. While preferred security structures and the use of 
control provisions such as anti-dilution clauses are generally used as complements, 
common share deals and debt-like securities rely more heavily on controlling ownership 
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stakes, and much less frequently on other control provisions. Taken together, these results 
suggest that contracts either seem to follow a structure that is fairly reminiscent of U.S. 
contracts—i.e., preferred type securities accompanied by a number of control 
provisions—or rely on debt or common stock securities without many other control 
provisions. 
 
5. Conclusions 
While variations in public securities markets across nations have attracted 
increasing scrutiny, the determinants of the variations in private financings have attracted 
much less attention.  This neglect is particularly worrisome in developing nations, since 
the bulk of financings in these markets are private ones. 
 
This paper seeks to understand how the origins of legal regimes, as well as 
differences in the enforcement of these laws, affect private transactions in developing 
nations.  We focus on a well-documented and reasonable systematized set of transactions: 
investments by private equity groups into entrepreneurial or restructuring firms.  This 
paper analyzes a sample of 210 transactions from a wide variety of private equity groups 
in developing countries.  We assess deal structures, and how they vary with the nature of 
the nations in which the investments are made.   
 
We find a number of interesting patterns: 
• Unlike in the United States, where the use of convertible preferred securities is 
ubiquitous, in developing nations a much broader array of securities are 
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employed.  Protections of private equity investor rights that are standard in the 
United States are encountered far less frequently. 
• The choice of security employed appears to be driven by the circumstances of 
the private equity group and the nation.  Investments in common law nations and 
by private equity groups based in the U.S. and U.K. are considerably less likely 
to employ common stock or straight debt, and more likely to employ preferred 
stock. 
• In nations where the rule of law is less well established, private equity groups 
emphasize equity protection.  They are likely to make the size of their equity 
stakes contingent on the performance of the company and to have the majority of 
the firm’s equity if the investment encounters difficulties.  
• Transactions in common law nations are generally associated with more 
contractual protections for the private equity group.  Transaction features appear 
to be highly correlated, with preferred stock transactions being associated with 
the greater use of a variety of contractual protections, while the use of other 
securities is associated with the private equity group having a larger equity stake. 
• Board structures are little different from the U.S.  Transactions in common law 
nations have greater founder and manager board representation, suggesting that 
board composition may substitute for contractual provisions. 
• While U.K.- and U.S.-based private equity groups are more likely to write 
contracts that resemble provisions in their home countries, they are not able to 
fully replicate U.S.-style contracts and adjust many provisions to the local 
environment.  
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• These contractual differences appear to have real consequences: larger 
transactions with higher valuations are seen in common law countries. 
• These differences in transactions across nations are not simply consequences of 
the actual legal curbs in these nations.  The patterns continue to hold when we 
eliminate nations where the financing choice is “hard wired” by the law.  
 
We believe that this study makes two contributions.  First, because of the 
relatively simple yet well-documented nature of these contracts, we can readily test 
theories of corporate finance across different institutional environments.  The results that 
emerge from this analysis simultaneously are consistent with and extend the findings of 
the law and finance literature, which has largely focused on public firms.  Second, the 
topic of private equity investment in developing countries is an important topic in its own 
right: at least $15 billion of international development aid alone has been channeled 
through these funds (Brenner [1999]). 
 
This analysis, it should be noted, leaves questions unanswered about private 
equity contracts in developing countries.  Key issues include why we do not see the use 
transaction structures familiar from the United States setting in developing countries, and 
how detrimental these differences are.  One possible explanation is that investors demand 
controlling blocks because courts and laws do not adequately protect minority 
shareholders. Given the necessity to rely on controlling stakes, investors might 
(optimally) choose common stock over preferred as a second best outcome, if preferred 
stock gives too much cash flow and control rights to the investor.  
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There are also other important questions about private equity in developing 
countries that we do not address in this paper.  Foremost among these are the apparently 
disappointing returns that these investments have yielded over the past decade and the 
declining share of all private equity investments that they represent.  From where have 
the difficulties encountered by private equity investments in developing countries 
sprung?  Are these a function of the general macroeconomic troubles that led to public 
equity investors in many developing countries to experience low returns during much of 
the 1990s?  Or do the difficulties stem from the differences in transaction structures from 
the U.S. template that we have highlighted above?13 
 
A second important topic for further research relates to the role of government 
programs.  National governments and multinational development organizations have 
made substantial investments to stimulate the growth of private equity.  These initiatives 
have taken many forms, from direct investments in entrepreneurial firms to the provision 
of subsidies to private equity groups.  How effective have these efforts been?  Do any 
approaches appear to have been particularly successful?  
                                                 
13A related issue is the similarities and differences between the structure of private and 
public equity investments in developing nations.  The work of Bergman and Nicolaievsky 
[2003] highlights the differences between these contracts in the Mexican setting.  A 
cross-national analysis of these differences would be a rewarding analysis. 
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Table 1—Construction of sample.  This table summarizes the key features associated with the 
construction of the sample of 210 private equity transactions. 
 
 
 
Private Equity 
Group 
Year of Deal Industry of Firm Deal Type Country of Firm 
Group 1 8 1987 2 Distribution/Retail 14 Buyout 28 Argentina 18 
Group 2 6 1988 2 Finance 16 Corp. Acquisition 10 Bolivia 2 
Group 3 6 1992 3 Food 29 Distress 4 Brazil 18 
Group 4 5 1993 4 Health Care 9 Expansion 97 Bulgaria 8 
Group 5 3 1994 2 Information Tech 24 IPO 12 Chile 7 
Group 6 3 1995 5 Internet 9 Privatization 10 China 13 
Group 7 10 1996 10 Manufacturing 32 Venture Capital 49 Estonia 8 
Group 8 8 1997 17 Media 8   Ghana 3 
Group 9 6 1998 35 Natural Resources 11   Hong Kong 13 
Group 10 6 1999 31 Real Estate 4   India 28 
Group 11 11 2000 34 Services 17   Korea 10 
Group 12 3 2001 40 Software 10   Indonesia 2 
Group 13 2 2002 22 Telecom 14   Latvia 4 
Group 14 4 2003 3 Other 13   Malaysia 2 
Group 15 10       Mexico 14 
Group 16 8       Peru 2 
Group 17 6       Poland 13 
Group 18 5       Romania 18 
Group 19 10       Singapore 6 
Group 20 13       South Africa     2 
Group 21 14       Taiwan     4 
Group 22 8       Tanzania     2 
Group 23 5       Thailand     3 
Group 24 7       Uruguay     2 
Group 25 21       Yugoslavia     6 
Group 26 13       Other     5 
Group 27 7         
Group 28 2         
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Table 2—Characteristics of developing country private equity transactions.   The sample consists of 
210 investments in developing countries by private equity groups (PEGs).  The first panel describes the 
features of the transactions; the second panel, the features of the nation and the private equity group 
involved in the transaction.  We do not record the medians and standard deviations of the dummy variables. 
 
Panel A: Setting of Transactions 
 Mean Median Standard Dev Minimum Maximum 
Per capita gross national product 2142 1743 2561 181 12368 
Logarithm of rule of law index 0.22 0.28 0.59 -1.25 1.85 
English legal family nation 0.27   0 1 
French legal family nation 0.30   0 1 
Socialist legal family country 0.42   0 1 
U.K. or U.S.-based private equity group 0.56   0 1 
Panel B: Nature of Transactions 
 Mean Median Standard Dev Minimum Maximum 
Size of financing (1997 $MMs) 4.31 3.29 5.12 0.17 18.53 
Implied valuation (1997 $MMs) 5.12 4.18 4.92 0.45 61.38a 
Straight debt 0.11   0 1 
Convertible debt 0.13   0 1
Common stock 0.55   0 1
Straight preferred stock 0.09   0 1
Participating preferred stock 0.05   0 1
Convertible preferred stock 0.21   0 1
Warrants 0.06   0 1
Contingent equity 0.34   0 1
PEG’s maximum equity stake 0.47 0.40 0.37 0 1 
PEG’s minimum equity stake 0.33 0.38 0.38 0 1 
Difference in PEG ownership 0.15 0.01 0.26 0 1
PEG has control when maximum stake  0.37   0 1
PEG has control when minimum stake 0.29   0 1
Anti-dilution provisions 0.27   0 1
Automatic conversion provisions 0.26   0 1
PEG has redemption rights 0.31   0 1
PEG protected against down rounds 0.10   0 1
Vesting of founders 0.05   0 1
Restrictions on founder stock sales 0.49   0 1
Maximum board size 6.50 6 2.03 3 12 
Minimum board size 5.40 5 1.95 3 11 
Maximum PEG board seats 2.66 2 1.89 0 9 
Minimum PEG board seats 1.35 1 1.24 0 6 
Maximum founder/manager board seats 3.22 3 1.87 0 7 
Minimum founder/manager board seats 2.47 2 1.72 0 6 
Supermajority sum 18.47 15 12.98 0 57 
 
aThe size of the financing is greater than the valuation in the largest transaction (a leveraged buyout which 
entailed the purchase of all of the firm’s equity) because part of the financing proceeds were used to cover 
fees to investment bankers, lawyers, and others. 
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Table 3—Description of non-standard characteristics of developing country private equity 
transactions.   The sample consists of 210 investments in developing countries by private equity groups 
(PEGs).   
 
Panel A: Exit Provisions 
 Frequency 
Contract specifies trade sale to strategic buyer as exit goal, not IPO 28 
If exit is not reached within stated time, firm has to pay annual dividends > 50% of profits 14 
PEG has a put that can be triggered at any time if there are disagreements with management 13 
PEG is investing along side a strategic buyer who might ultimately buy the firm 8 
If exit is not reached within stated time, PEG can put back money to parent company of firm 7 
Contract pre-specifies an “arbitrator”, for example an investment bank, in case of discrepancies 
between shareholders to avoid delays in the courts 
4 
If exit is not reached in stated time, PEG can put back shares at a price agreed upon by at least 
three “reputable” investment banks 
3 
Panel B: Financing Provisions 
 Frequency 
Debt converts to equity if firm defaults 9 
PEG issues debt that is backed by guarantees of the parent company of a firm 6 
“Forgivable” debt: if firms reaches certain earnings targets, loan is converted into 0% equity  4 
Majority shareholder of company issues the bond, not company, to avoid political constraints 3 
Government debt becomes subordinate to equity if the firm defaults 2 
Panel C: Anti-Dilution Provisions 
 Frequency 
No anti-dilution rights per se, but existing investors have to approve issuance of new shares 15 
PEG equity stake remains unchanged independent of valuation in next round 5 
Panel D: Other Provisions 
 Frequency 
Business dealings with firms owned by family members of the founders/managers have to be 
approved by PEG 
5 
Founder family members agree not to be involved in competing business unless approved by 
the PEG 
4 
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Table 4—Regression analyses of security type in developing country private equity transactions.  The 
sample consists of 210 investments in developing countries by private equity groups (PEGs).  The 
dependent variables are dummies denoting whether common stock was employed in the transaction, 
straight debt was employed in the transaction, preferred stock was employed in the transaction, the equity 
stake is contingent on the performance of the firm, and the presence of caps and/or floors on the payouts to 
the PEGs.  Independent variables include the logarithms of an index of the rule of law and per capita gross 
national product, and dummy variables denoting nations with British or French legal origins and funds 
based in the U.K. or U.S.  All regressions employ ordinary least squares specifications.  Standard errors are 
in brackets. 
 
Panel A: Use of Straight Debt 
Rule of law index -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.16 
 [0.06] [0.09] [0.08] [0.09] 
British legal origins -0.14 -0.14 -0.16 -0.05 
 ***[0.06] ***[0.06] ***[0.07] [0.18] 
French legal origins  0.12 0.11 0.26 
  ***[0.06] **[0.06] *[0.15] 
GNP per capita -0.03 -0.04 -0.04 -0.07 
 [0.07] [0.07] [0.08] [0.08] 
U.K. or U.S. based PEG   -0.12  
   ***[0.05]  
Judicial Efficiency    -0.04 
    [0.18] 
Industry dummies Y Y Y Y 
Deal type dummies Y Y Y Y 
Year dummies Y Y Y Y 
Number of observations 210 210 210 182 
Adjusted R2 0.18 0.19 0.21 0.23 
Panel B: Use of Common Stock 
Rule of law index -0.05 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 
 [0.11] [0.09] [0.10] [0.11] 
British legal origins -0.16 -0.16 -0.15 -0.38 
 **[0.09] **[0.09] **[0.08] **[0.26] 
French legal origins  -0.14 -0.13 -0.31 
  *[0.10] *[0.10] [0.28] 
GNP per capita -0.15 -0.14 -0.13 -0.11 
 **[0.08] *[0.11] *[0.11] [0.11] 
U.K. or U.S. based PEG   -0.15  
   ***[0.07]  
Judicial Efficiency    -0.08 
    [0.09] 
Industry dummies Y Y Y Y 
Deal type dummies Y Y Y Y 
Year dummies Y Y Y Y 
Number of observations 210 210 210 182 
Adjusted R2 0.19 0.21 0.22 0.24 
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Panel C: Use of Preferred Stock 
Rule of law index 0.08 0.13 0.12 0.07 
 [0.07] *[0.08] [012] [0.13] 
British legal origins 0.23 0.24 0.23 0.67 
 **[0.13] **[0.13] ***[0.11] ***[0.28] 
French legal origins  0.11 0.09 0.60 
  [0.09] [0.10] **[0.30] 
GNP per capita 0.07 0.07 0.10 0.11 
 [0.10] [0.10] [0.09] [0.12] 
U.K. or U.S. based PEG   0.15  
   **[0.08]  
Judicial Efficiency     0.49 
    **[0.26] 
Industry dummies Y Y Y Y 
Deal type dummies Y Y Y Y 
Year dummies Y Y Y Y 
Number of observations 210 210 210 182 
Adjusted R2 0.16 0.18 0.21 0.24 
 
*=Significant at the 10% level; **=significant at the 5% level; ***=significant at the 1% level. 
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Table 5—Regression analyses of equity ownership in developing country private equity transactions.  
The sample consists of 210 investments in developing countries by private equity groups (PEGs).  The 
dependent variables are dummies denoting whether the PEG has control of the firm’s equity when it has its 
maximum and minimum contractually specified share of the equity, and the difference in the equity 
ownership stake in these two scenarios.  Independent variables include the logarithms of an index of the 
rule of law and per capita gross national product, and dummy variables denoting nations with British or 
French legal origins and funds based in the U.K. or U.S.  All regressions employ ordinary least squares 
specifications.  Standard errors are in brackets. 
 
Panel A: Does PEG Have Control When Minimum Stake? 
Rule of law index -0.16 -0.12 -0.13 -0.06 
 ***[0.07] *[0.08] *[0.08] [0.12] 
British legal origins -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 -0.41 
 [0.08] [0.08] [0.08] *[0.29] 
French legal origins  0.19 0.11 0.58 
  ***[0.05] **[0.06] ***[0.21] 
GNP per capita 0.12 0.09 0.11 0.05 
 ***[0.05] **[0.05] **[0.06] [0.07] 
U.K. or U.S. based PEG   -0.11  
   ***[0.05]  
Judicial Efficiency    -0.26 
    *[0.17] 
Industry dummies Y Y Y Y 
Deal type dummies Y Y Y Y 
Year dummies Y Y Y Y 
Number of observations 194 194 194 171 
Adjusted R2 0.18 0.19 0.21 0.23 
Panel B: Does PEG Have Control When Maximum Stake? 
Rule of law index -0.25 -0.26 -0.29 -0.14 
 ***[0.08] ***[0.09] ***[0.09] *[0.11] 
British legal origins 0.15 0.13 0.15 0.93 
 *[0.10] *[0.09] **[0.08] ***[0.33] 
French legal origins  0.01 0.04 0.20 
  [0.06] [0.06] **[0.09] 
GNP per capita 0.19 0.19 0.21 0.23 
 ***[0.06] ***[0.07] ***[0.08] ***[0.08] 
U.K. or U.S. based PEG   0.09  
   *[0.06]  
Judicial Efficiency     -0.34 
    **[0.20] 
Industry dummies Y Y Y Y 
Deal type dummies Y Y Y Y 
Year dummies Y Y Y Y 
Number of observations 194 194 194 171 
Adjusted R2 0.17 0.20 0.21 0.22 
Panel C: Difference Between Maximum and Minimum PEG Stake 
Rule of law index -0.08 -0.09 -0.06 -0.14 
 *[0.05] *[0.06] [0.06] **[0.08] 
British legal origins 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.39 
 ***[0.06] ***[0.06] ***[0.06] *[0.27] 
French legal origins  -0.04 -0.03 -0.18 
  [0.04] [0.04] [0.24] 
GNP per capita 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.15 
 **[0.04] **[0.04] *[0.04] ***[0.06] 
U.K. or U.S. based PEG   0.03  
   [0.03]  
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Judicial Efficiency    -0.07 
    [0.13] 
Industry dummies Y Y Y Y 
Deal type dummies Y Y Y Y 
Year dummies Y Y Y Y 
Number of observations 194 194 194 171 
Adjusted R2 0.16 0.17 0.19 0.21 
 
*=Significant at the 10% level; **=significant at the 5% level; ***=significant at the 1% level. 
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Table 6—Regression analyses of control rights in developing country private equity transactions.  
The sample consists of 210 investments in developing countries by private equity groups (PEGs).  The 
dependent variables are dummies denoting whether the PEG group has anti-dilution protection, redemption 
rights, and automatic conversion requirements.  Independent variables include the logarithms of an index of 
the rule of law and per capita gross national product, and dummy variables denoting nations with British or 
French legal origins and funds based in the U.K. or U.S.  All regressions employ ordinary least squares 
specifications.  Standard errors are in brackets. 
 
Panel A: Anti-Dilution Protection 
Rule of law index 0.08 0.05 0.02 0.02 
 [0.11] [0.12] [012] [0.14] 
British legal origins 0.33 0.34 0.33 0.34 
 ***[0.13] ***[0.13] ***[0.13] ***[0.13] 
French legal origins  0.08 0.12 0.14 
  [0.10] [0.10] *[0.10] 
GNP per capita 0.17 0.16 0.14 0.10 
 **[0.09] **[0.09] *[0.10] [0.14] 
U.K. or U.S. based PEG   0.14  
   **[0.08]  
Judicial Efficiency    0.28 
    [0.31] 
Industry dummies Y Y Y Y 
Deal type dummies Y Y Y Y 
Year dummies Y Y Y Y 
Number of observations 210 210 210 184 
Adjusted R2 0.17 0.19 0.22 0.25 
Panel B: Redemption Rights 
Rule of law index 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.15 
 [0.12] [0.12] [0.12] [0.13] 
British legal origins 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.39 
 [0.13] [0.13] [0.14] *[0.24] 
French legal origins  -0.01 -0.01 -0.34 
  [0.10] [0.10] [0.27] 
GNP per capita 0.10 0.10 0.17 0.03 
 [0.09] [0.10] [0.10] [0.11] 
U.K. or U.S. based PEG   0.20  
   ***[0.08]  
Judicial efficiency    0.23 
     [0.26] 
Industry dummies Y Y Y Y 
Deal type dummies Y Y Y Y 
Year dummies Y Y Y Y 
Number of observations 210 210 210 184 
Adjusted R2 0.09 0.12 0.13 0.14 
Panel C: Automatic Conversion  
Rule of law index -0.17 -0.15 -0.09 -0.27 
 *[0.11] *[0.11] [0.11] *[0.17] 
British legal origins 0.22 0.22 0.20 0.45 
 **[0.12] **[0.12] *[0.12] *[0.29] 
French legal origins  0.04 0.03 0.11 
  [0.10] [0.10] [0.34] 
GNP per capita 0.18 0.17 0.17 0.27 
 ***[0.09] **[0.09] **[0.09] ***[0.13] 
U.K. or U.S. based PEG   0.22  
   ***[0.08]  
Judicial Efficiency    0.25 
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    [0.32] 
Industry dummies Y Y Y Y 
Deal type dummies Y Y Y Y 
Year dummies Y Y Y Y 
Number of observations 210 210 210 184 
Adjusted R2 0.07 0.09 0.10 0.12 
 
*=Significant at the 10% level; **=significant at the 5% level; ***=significant at the 1% level. 
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Table 7—Regression analyses of restrictions on founders’ and managers’ equity stakes in developing 
country private equity transactions.  The sample consists of 81 investments in developing countries by 
private equity groups (PEGs).  The dependent variables are dummies denoting if the shares of the firms’ 
founders and managers must vest and if there are restrictions on securities sales by founders and managers.  
Independent variables include the logarithms of an index of property rights and per capita gross national 
product, and dummy variables denoting nations with British or French legal origins and funds based in a 
common law nation.  All regressions employ ordinary least squares specifications.  Standard errors are in 
brackets. 
 
Panel A: Vesting of Founder and Manager Stock 
Rule of law index 0.02 0.07 0.03 0.01 
 [0.13] [0.16] [0.16] [0.15] 
British legal origins 0.04 -0.01 0.06 0.08 
 [0.07] [0.12] [0.10] [0.11] 
French legal origins  -0.06 -0.05 -0.06 
  [0.07] [0.07] [0.07] 
GNP per capita 0.01 -0.04 -0.03 -0.01 
 [0.04] [0.05] [0.05] [0.04] 
U.K. or U.S. based PEG   0.07  
   [0.06]  
Judicial Efficiency    0.04 
    [0.03] 
Industry dummies Y Y Y Y 
Deal type dummies Y Y Y Y 
Year dummies Y Y Y Y 
Number of observations 76 76 76 76 
Adjusted R2 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.04 
Panel B: Restrictions on Sales of Founder and Manager Stock  
Rule of law index -0.62 -0.63 -0.63 -0.60 
 *[0.32] *[0.35] *[0.34] [0.44] 
British legal origins 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.07 
 [0.22] [0.26] [0.25] [0.25] 
French legal origins  0.004 0.004 0.004 
  [0.16] [0.18] [0.18] 
GNP per capita -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
 [0.10] [0.10] [0.11] [0.11] 
Common law based PEG   0.02  
   [0.14]  
Judicial Efficiency    0.09 
    [0.7] 
Industry dummies Y Y Y Y 
Deal type dummies Y Y Y Y 
Year dummies Y Y Y Y 
Number of observations 76 76 76 76 
Adjusted R2 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.07 
 
*=Significant at the 10% level; **=significant at the 5% level; ***=significant at the 1% level. 
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Table 8—Regression analyses of board seats in developing country private equity transactions.  The 
sample consists of 210 investments in developing countries by private equity groups (PEGs).  The 
dependent variables are the logarithms of the maximum number of seats on the board, as well as the 
maximum assigned the founders and managers and the PEG.  Independent variables include the logarithms 
of an index of the rule of law and per capita gross national product, and dummy variables denoting nations 
with British or French legal origins and funds based in the U.K. or U.S.  All regressions employ ordinary 
least squares specifications.  Standard errors are in brackets. 
 
Panel A: Total Maximum Board Seats 
Rule of law index -0.09 -0.09 -0.16 -0.19 
 [0.11] [0.12] *[0.12] *[0.15] 
British legal origins 0.31 0.33 0.36 0.08 
 ***[0.11] ***[0.11] ***[0.12] [0.19] 
French legal origins  -0.06 -0.14 -0.12 
  [0.09] *[0.09] [0.19] 
GNP per capita 0.09 0.09 0.14 0.16 
 [0.09] [0.09] *[0.10] [0.12] 
U.K. or U.S. based PEG   0.15  
   ***[0.07]  
Judicial Efficiency    -0.28 
    *[0.20] 
Industry dummies Y Y Y Y 
Deal type dummies Y Y Y Y 
Year dummies Y Y Y Y 
Number of observations 197 197 197 168 
Adjusted R2 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.10 
Panel B: Maximum PEG Board Seats 
Rule of law index -0.09 -0.08 -0.08 -0.07 
 [0.08] [0.07] [0.07] [0.07] 
British legal origins -0.19 -0.18 -0.21 -0.22 
 *[0.11] *[0.12] **[0.11] **[0.11] 
French legal origins  -0.17 -0.12 -0.15 
  *[0.10] [0.10] [0.11] 
GNP per capita 0.46 0.30 0.30 0.34 
 *[0.32] [0.31] [0.31] [0.31] 
U.K. or U.S. based PEG   0.39  
   ***[0.14]  
Judicial Efficiency    -0.59 
    [0.44] 
Industry dummies Y Y Y Y 
Deal type dummies Y Y Y Y 
Year dummies Y Y Y Y 
Number of observations 197 197 197 168 
Adjusted R2 0.06 0.08 0.10 0.11 
Panel C: Maximum Founder and Manager Board Seats 
Rule of law index 0.13 0.01 0.02 0.06 
 [0.19] [0.22] [0.20] [0.23] 
British legal origins 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.74 
 *[0.21] *[0.21] *[0.22] **[0.38] 
French legal origins  0.20 0.18 0.03 
  [0.19] [0.20] [0.09] 
GNP per capita 0.15 0.08 0.09 0.08 
 [0.13] [0.17] [0.17] [0.16] 
U.K. or U.S. based PEG   0.23  
   **[0.13]  
Judicial Efficiency    0.62 
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    [0.65] 
Industry dummies Y Y Y Y 
Deal type dummies Y Y Y Y 
Year dummies N Y Y Y 
Number of observations 197 197 197 168 
Adjusted R2 0.06 0.09 0.10 0.10 
 
*=Significant at the 10% level; **=significant at the 5% level; ***=significant at the 1% level. 
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Table 9—Regression analyses of supermajority provisions in developing country private equity 
transactions.  The sample consists of 210 investments in developing countries by private equity groups 
(PEGs).  The dependent variable is a sum of the score of supermajority provisions.  (A higher score implies 
greater use of supermajority provisions.)  Independent variables include the logarithms of an index of the 
rule of law and per capita gross national product, and dummy variables denoting nations with British or 
French legal origins and funds based in the U.K. or U.S.  All regressions employ ordinary least squares 
specifications.  Standard errors are in brackets. 
 
Dependent Variable: Supermajority Provision Score 
Rule of law index -14.35 -20.95 -23.67 -26.65 
 ***[7.82] ***[9.49] ***[9.98] ***[10.74] 
British legal origins 9.83 13.65 11.19 11.44 
 ***[4.55] **[6.70] **[7.96] *[8.12] 
French legal origins   -11.06 -11.48 
   **[5.11] **[5.67] 
GNP per capita 3.63 6.01 5.24 5.96 
 *[2.93] *[4.86] [4.56] [5.02] 
U.K. or U.S. based PEG   1.93  
   [4.85]  
Judicial Efficiency    3.48 
    *[2.24] 
Industry dummies Y Y Y Y 
Deal type dummies Y Y Y Y 
Year dummies Y Y Y Y 
Number of observations 210 210 210 184 
Adjusted R2 0.29 0.25 0.24 0.23 
 
*=Significant at the 10% level; **=significant at the 5% level; ***=significant at the 1% level. 
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Table 10—Regression analyses of financing size and valuation in developing country private equity 
transactions.  The sample consists of 210 investments in developing countries by private equity groups 
(PEGs).  The dependent variables are the logarithms of the size of the financing and the implied “post-
money” valuation of the transaction, and a dummy denoting whether the financing provides some of the 
capital in a follow-on transaction.  Independent variables include the logarithms of sales in the year before 
the transaction, an index of the rule of law, and per capita gross national product, and dummy variables 
denoting nations with British or French legal origins and funds based in the U.K. or U.S.  The financing 
size, valuation, and sales figures are all in millions of 1997 dollars.  All regressions employ ordinary least 
squares specifications.  Standard errors are in brackets. 
 
Panel A: Size of Financing 
Sales 0.33 0.34 0.29 0.34 
 ***[0.08] ***[0.09] ***[0.10] ***[0.11] 
Rule of law index 0.85 0.45 0.48 0.20 
 *[0.49] [0.49] [0.43] [0.40] 
British legal origins 0.29 0.29 0.38 0.52 
 [0.41] [0.41] [0.47] [0.50] 
French legal origins  0.69 0.44 0.40 
  [0.41] [0.41] [0.43] 
GNP per capita 0.79 0.56 0.51 0.37 
 ***[0.34] *[0.36] *[0.36] [0.42] 
U.K. or U.S. based PEG   0.52  
   **[0.31]  
Judicial Efficiency    0.51 
    [0.93] 
Industry dummies Y Y Y Y 
Deal type dummies Y Y Y Y 
Year dummies Y Y Y Y 
Number of observations 193 193 193 172 
Adjusted R2 0.33 0.35 0.35 0.34 
Panel B: Implied Valuation  
Sales 0.38 0.37 0.38 0.34 
 ***[0.12] ***[0.12] ***[0.13] ***[0.15] 
Rule of law index 1.48 1.08 0.81 0.84 
 **[0.72] *[0.78] [0.89] [0.99] 
British legal origins 1.85 2.04 2.47 1.34 
 ***[0.88] ***[0.89] ***[0.92] *[0.97] 
French legal origins  1.06 1.06 0.84 
  *[0.71] *[0.76] [0.72] 
GNP per capita 0.87 0.75 0.56 0.69 
 *[0.65] [0.66] [0.79] [0.71] 
U.K. or U.S. based PEG   0.75  
   *[0.60]  
Judicial Efficiency    3.17 
    ***[1.48] 
Industry dummies Y Y Y Y 
Deal type dummies Y Y Y Y 
Year dummies Y Y Y Y 
Number of observations 193 193 193 172 
Adjusted R2 0.40 0.44 0.45 0.47 
 
*=Significant at the 10% level; **=significant at the 5% level; ***=significant at the 1% level.
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Table 11—Correlation matrix between different parts of private equity contracts.  The sample consists of 210 investments in developing countries by 
private equity groups (PEGs).  We regress the contract provision at the top of the column on the provisions at the beginning of each row. Each cell contains the 
coefficients from separate regressions of the contract provisions on the right-hand side variables (standard errors are reported in brackets). The first row in each 
cell reports results for the full sample, the second row reports results for UK legal origin countries only and the last row contains French and socialist legal origin 
countries only. We control for log of GNP, rule of law, and year, industry, deal type dummies. All variables are defined as before.  
 
Panel A: Correlation in Full Sample 
 Debt 
 
Common stock Preferred stock Anti-dilution 
 
Automatic 
conversion 
Redemption 
rights 
PEG equity 
stake 
Common stock 0.08 [0.04]*** 
0.09 [0.13] 
0.07 [0.05]* 
      
Preferred stock  -0.02 [0.04] 
-0.02 [0.12] 
-0.03 [0.06] 
-0.21 [0.07]***  
-0.38 [0.15]*** 
-0.01 [0.09] 
 
     
Anti-dilution  -0.01 [0.04] 
-0.05 [0.03]** 
  0.01 [0.07] 
-0.25 [0.07]*** 
-0.22 [0.11]** 
-0.09 [0.13] 
0.16 [0.07]*** 
0.11 [0.05]*** 
0.13 [0.12] 
 
    
Automatic conversion  -0.09 [0.05]** 
-0.18 [0.09]** 
-0.07 [0.07] 
-0.50 [0.07]*** 
-0.20 [0.14]* 
-0.46 [0.10]*** 
0.34 [0.08]*** 
0.43 [0.14]*** 
0.32 [0.10]*** 
0.43 [0.07]*** 
0.85 [0.15]*** 
0.20 [0.10] 
 
   
Redemption rights -0.02 [0.04] 
-0.04 [0.10] 
  0.03 [0.06] 
-0.12 [0.07]** 
-0.11 [0.15] 
-0.13 [0.11] 
0.14 [0.07]*** 
0.43 [0.15]*** 
-0.07 [0.08] 
 0.09 [0.07] 
 0.41 [0.21]** 
0.07 [0.07] 
0.26 [0.07]*** 
0.30 [0.15]*** 
0.12 [0.07]** 
 
  
PEG maximum equity stake 0.22 [0.09]*** 
0.01 [0.09] 
0.51 [0.15]*** 
-0.02 [0.14] 
-0.50 [0.45] 
-0.20 [0.20] 
 0.20 [0.16] 
-0.06 [0.48] 
-0.03 [0.24] 
 0.18 [0.16] 
 0.66 [0.58] 
 0.13 [0.19] 
-0.07 [0.17] 
-0.08 [0.45] 
-0.20 [0.23] 
  
-0.16 [0.17] 
-0.89 [0.38]*** 
-0.28 [0.24] 
 
 
Maximum board size 
 
-0.03 [0.08] 
  0.08 [0.20] 
 -0.04 [0.10] 
 0.04 [0.15] 
 0.33 [0.34] 
 0.12 [0.10] 
0.38 [0.15]*** 
0.56 [0.31]** 
0.32 [0.20]* 
 0.16 [0.17] 
 0.05 [0.45] 
 0.13 [0.20] 
 0.06 [0.14] 
 0.23 [0.44] 
-0.18 [0.16] 
-0.08 [0.16] 
 0.31 [0.35] 
-0.21 [0.22] 
 0.10 [0.12] 
-1.14 [0.65]* 
 0.23 [0.31] 
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Panel B: Correlation with Deal Size and Implied Valuation 
 Deal Size  Implied Valuation 
Common stock -0.48 [0.26]** 
-0.53 [0.54] 
-0.56 [0.35]*  
-0.61 [0.34]* 
-0.64 [0.62] 
-0.68 [0.64] 
  
Preferred stock   0.12 [0.07]** 
 0.38 [0.42] 
 0.04 [0.36] 
  
-0.42 [0.37]  
 0.07 [0.59] 
-0.75 [0.61] 
Anti-dilution   0.41 [0.28]* 
 0.96 [0.31]*** 
 0.11 [0.47] 
 0.61 [0.31]** 
 1.02 [0.42]*** 
 0.43 [0.79] 
  
Automatic conversion   0.27 [0.28] 
 1.19 [0.37]*** 
-0.07 [0.38] 
   
 0.20 [0.40] 
 1.17 [0.51]*** 
-0.79 [0.63] 
  
Redemption rights  0.13 [0.24] 
 0.15 [0.45] 
 0.13 [0.34] 
  
 0.03 [0.37] 
 0.51 [0.56] 
-0.12 [0.58] 
 
PEG maximum equity stake  1.25 [0.56]*** 
 1.49 [1.00]* 
 1.07 [0.81] 
   
 1.68 [0.94]* 
 1.06 [1.64] 
-2.76 [1.23]*** 
 
Maximum board size  2.05 [0.48]*** 
 2.28 [1.05]*** 
 1.77 [0.64]*** 
 1.69 [0.53]*** 
 1.89 [0.74]*** 
 0.92 [0.95] 
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Appendix: Key legal provisions affecting private equity investors in nine nations most frequently represented in the sample. 
 
Class of 
Limitation Argentina Brazil Hong Kong India Mexico 
People's Republic of 
China Poland Republic of Korea Romania 
Security Type 
No restrictions, but 
preferred stock can 
only have same 
vote as common 
stock.  Also possible 
to have common 
stock with enhanced 
voting rights (up to 5 
votes). No restrictions. No restrictions. 
Preferred stocks 
cannot have any 
voting rights, 
except in special 
circumstances.  
Limits on extent of 
returns preferred 
shareholders can 
enjoy. 
No restrictions, but 
some limitations 
on voting rights of 
preferred 
shareholders. 
Most domestic and 
foreign private equity 
investments must 
employ common stock-
like structure.  Some 
large investments may 
use other securities, but 
must receive authorities' 
permission first. 
No restrictions, but 
limitations on 
voting (no more 
than 2-3x common 
stock), dividend, 
and liquidation 
preference rights 
of preferred 
shareholders. 
No restrictions, but 
only common 
stock had voting 
rights until late 
1990s.  Now, no 
restrictions. 
No restrictions, but 
investors cannot 
require that 
classes of 
shareholders vote 
as a block. 
Super-Majority 
Provisions No restrictions. No restrictions. 
No restrictions.  
Many corporate 
events require 
approval of 75% of 
shareholders.  
No restrictions.  
Some corporate 
events require 
approval of 75% of 
shareholders.  
No restrictions.  
Some legal 
protections for 
minority 
shareholders (e.g., 
right to name at 
least one director). 
No restrictions.  Some 
corporate events must 
have 2/3rd approval by 
investors.  For foreign 
investments, decisions 
must be approved by 
2/3rds of directors in 
many cases. 
No restrictions.  
Some corporate 
events must have 
75% approval by 
investors. No restrictions. No restrictions. 
Management 
Equity Holdings 
No restrictions.  
Ambiguities 
surround tax 
treatment of 
options. 
Limitations on types of 
firms who can issue 
stock options.  Special 
disclosure requirements 
for option-issuing firms.  
Disadvantageous tax 
treatment of options.  
No restrictions, 
except that 
shareholders in 
private firms must 
first offer shares to 
other investors. 
No restrictions on 
private firms. No restrictions. 
For most investments, 
not possible to issue 
equity to management.  
May be allowed in 
certain very large 
investments, but 
permission of authorities 
may be required. No restrictions. No restrictions. No restrictions. 
Reinvestment 
and Anti-Dilution 
Provisions 
Equity holders can 
maintain pro rata 
share.  Provision 
can be waived with 
shareholder vote. 
Equity holders can 
maintain pro rata share.  
Restrictions on 
unreasonably dilutive 
financings. 
Equity holders can 
maintain pro rata 
share.  
Equity holders can 
maintain pro rata 
share.  Provision 
can be waived with 
shareholder vote. 
Equity holders can 
maintain pro rata 
share.  Provision 
can be waived with 
shareholder vote. 
Equity holders have pre-
emptive right to purchase 
shares, except for certain 
very large investments. 
Equity holders can 
maintain pro rata 
share.  Provision 
can be waived with 
80% shareholder 
vote. 
Equity holders 
have pre-emptive 
right to purchase 
shares, with limited 
exceptions. 
Equity holders 
have pre-emptive 
right to purchase 
shares, except for 
some private firms. 
Domiciling Entity 
Could be domiciled 
overseas until 
recently.  Now 
substantial 
difficulties to do so. 
Can be domiciled 
overseas, but may be 
more difficult to enforce 
corporate rights locally. 
Can be domiciled 
overseas. 
Can be domiciled 
overseas. 
Can be domiciled 
overseas. 
Cannot be domiciled 
overseas. 
Can be domiciled 
overseas. 
Can be domiciled 
overseas.  May 
entail loss of 
attractive tax 
incentives for start-
ups. 
These restrictions 
cannot be avoided 
by domiciling 
company in 
another country. 
 
